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Abstract
Luti Masculinity in Iranian Modernity, 1785-1941: Marginalization and the Anxieties of Proper
Masculine Comportment
by
Robert Joseph Bell
Adviser: Professor Samira Haj

This paper offers a genealogy of changing conceptualizations and performances of masculinity in
19th and early to mid-20th century Iran, and examines in particular a unique group of masculine
subjects known as the lutis. The first component of the analysis traces the historical lineage of
these lutis, situating their emergence out of Persian Sufi brotherhoods, bandit clans (‘ayyar), and
guild-like organizations (futuwwa) from the period of the 15th to the 19th century CE. This
section provides an account of the most pertinent and distinguishing rites, attitudes, and practices
of the lutis, most notably their involvement in the tradition of Iranian wrestling (koshti
pahlavani) as performed in so-called Houses of Strength (zurkhaneh). In reflecting on their
specific practices, this account reveals the deep imbrication of the lutis with a particular spiritual
and martial mode of masculinity; expressed as the state of being javanmard or of having
javanmardi (literally, “youngmanliness”). The second component of the analysis demonstrates
how, from the late-19th century, the javanmardi embodiments, social enactments and sartorial
comportments of the lutis came to stand in increasing tension with new norms of manliness
(mardanegi) promoted in Iranian governmental and societal discourses of modernization. The
section proceeds to show how an intensification of these discourses and their accompanying
iv

policies, particularly during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911), would signify the
lutis as a menacing, counter-normative and anxiety-provoking antipode to the (attempted)
formation of a unifying national Iranian masculine gender identity, a new conception of
manhood defined by compulsory heterosexuality, monogamous marriage, ‘rational’ political
roles and Westernizing sartorial presentations. The significatory processes of the Qajar (17851925) and first Pahlavi periods (1925-1941) would gradually produce a narrative of the lutis as
deviant, chaotic, violent, and sexually ambiguous subjects, a distinctly non-normative measure of
manhood in the Iranian political and cultural imaginary. Employing critical and queer theoretical
approaches to the historical formation of gender and sexuality, this paper thus attempts to draw
out the phenomenologically lived experience of the lutis as excluded masculine subjects while
also situating the development of normative conceptions of manhood and masculinity into
broader histories of the critical formation of modernity in Iran.
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Introduction

As gender and sexuality studies continue to transform research within Middle East
history, increased historiographical attention has been paid to the emergence, construction, and
re-formation of categories and concepts of ‘masculinity’ and ‘manhood’ across the region. The
gendering of historical analysis – a pressing methodological concern most notably articulated by
Joan Scott – has revealed how operational categories of state, culture, and society are always
already gendered entities, and how they and other institutions act to gender individuals and
assign markers of sexual difference and subjectivity.1 Reading the histories of concepts,
discourses, and institutions in this light has made it possible to historicize masculinity and the
socially and politically contested processes involved in the production and perpetuation of
recognizable masculine identities.2 In this account I aim to genealogically trace one such
masculine identity, a figure in the urban landscape of late-19th and early 20th century Iran known
as the luti, which I locate as historical-sociological type as well as a ‘figure of discourse’
conceived in the ‘modern’ Iranian imaginary in sometimes-contradictory ways through a variety
of representational strategies.3
1

Joan Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis” The American Historical Review, 91:5
(1986): 1053-1075.
2
For Middle Eastern contexts see, for example J.W. Wright Jr. and Everett K. Rowson, eds.,
Homoeroticism in Classical Arab Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Mai
Ghoussoub and Emma Sinclair-Webb, eds., Imagined Masculinities: Male Identity and Culture in the
Modern Middle East (London: Saqi Books, 2006); Kathryn Babayan and Afsaneh Najmabadi, eds.,
Islamicate Sexualities: Translations Across Temporal Geographies of Desire (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2008); Samira Aghacy, Masculine Identity in the Fiction of the Arab East since 1967
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2009). For a blistering critique of the colonial assumptions behind
some of these works, see Joseph Massad, Islam in Liberalism (Chicago and London: The University of
Chicago Press, 2015).
3
On this point of conceptual distinction I believe some clarification is necessary. My analysis takes the
luti to be an identifiable social category of personhood, and as such not entirely a construct or product of

1

In the secondary literature, Willem Floor has produced the most notable contemporary
exploration of the lutis as 19th century social phenomenon, though his articles rehearse pejorative
interpretations of their behaviour and practices.4 Floor’s central thesis takes the lutis as an
essentially conservative political weltanschauung, manifesting unpredictably as an undisciplined
rabble of toughs and active most fervently during the Constitutional Revolution and 1953 coup.
The Iranian sociologist Reza Arasteh has also written on the lutis, though he paints the group in a
more positive light than Floor’s investigation.5 Like Floor however, Arasteh considers the group
an archaic, though admirable, relic of pre-modern society, and referring (in the past tense) to a
mythologized understanding of the luti as “a man who possessed noble qualities; one who had a
sense of identity, that is, he carried out his promises, spoke the truth and developed such virtues
as perseverance, valor, and purity in thought, desire and action.”6 Vanessa Martin offers a
synthesis of a large variety of primary documentation of the lutis, including those from British
colonial authorities, and focuses primarily on the role of the group in social protest and the
mobilization of the urban poor in Iran at the turn of the 19th century.7 Martin’s definition of the

discourse and representation. However, I also conceive of the luti as a metatextual presence in the story of
Iranian modernity, as represented in literature and film. Tracing the emplotment of lutis as figures, or
objects of discourse will enrich my characterization of group’s affective role as antagonist in the
narratives of Iranian hegemonic masculinity. For a more detailed reflection on narrative emplotment in
the writing of history, see Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century
Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).
4
Willem M. Floor, “The Lutis: A Social Phenomenon in Qajar Persia, A Reappraisal” (1971); “The
Political Role of the Lutis in Qajar Iran” (1979); “The Political Role of the Lutis in Iran” in Modern Iran:
The Dialectics of Continuity and Change, eds. M.E. Bonine and N. Keddie (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1981).
5
Reza Arasteh, “The Character, Organization and Social Role of the Lutis (Javan-Mardan) in the
Traditional Iranian Society of the Nineteenth Century” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the
Orient, 4:1 (1961); Man and Society in Iran, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1964).
6
Reza Arasteh, “The Character, Organization and Social Role of the Lutis“ (1961): 1.
7
Vanessa Martin, The Qajar Pact: Bargaining, Protest and the State in Nineteenth-Century Persia,
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 113-133; Iran Between Islamic Nationalism and Secularism: The
Constitutional Revolution of 1906, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013).

2

lutis perhaps best reflects their contradictory character as the outcome a long process of
marginalization and social exclusion, describing the prototypical luti as “[an] urban rough who
lives on the edge of legality but is also capable of occasional acts of nobility and self-abnegation
or sacrifice.”8 These sources provide a general outline from where to begin an investigation into
the lutis, though none devote specific attention to the question of gender and sexuality, or the
relation of the quixotic masculine identity of the group to broader gendered processes involved in
the production of Iranian modernity.
Besides the accounts of Floor, Arasteh and Martin, the origins and position of lutis in the
hierarchies of Iranian social and cultural life has, for the most part, been relegated to a footnote
in the annals of Iranian historiography, a gap I hope to address in the historico-sociological
component of my analysis. This first section will draw out the lineage of the group from the
interwoven social formations of Sufi brotherhoods, bandit clans (‘ayyar), and guild-like
organizations (futuwwa) in the late-Timurid and Safavid imperial periods (15th-17th centuries
CE). In the following section I will proceed to give an account of the most pertinent and
distinguishing rites, attitudes, and performances associated with the group, including its practice
of traditional Iranian wrestling (koshti pahlavani), and, most notably, the deep imbrication of the
group with a specific ethical understanding of proper masculine comportment; being javanmard
or javanmardi (literally, “youngmanliness”). This ethical embodiment I understand to be a
significant and counter-normative rendering of the understandings of mardanegi (manliness)
employed by the modernizing Qajar and first Pahlavi-era Iranian state, and a counterpoint to
modernist discourses of desired compulsory heterosexuality, monogamous marriage, and a
8

Martin, Iran Between Islamic Nationalism and Secularism: The Constitutional Revolution of 1906 (New
York: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 213.

3

gentile, disciplined, and rational approach to masculine public roles and private ethical
behaviour. The distinction between the lutis as a masculine identity in sociological terms, and as
an object or figure of discourse is subtle, and mutually constitutive. Indeed, and as Judith Butler
declares, “[o]ne ‘exists’ not only by virtue of being recognized, but, in a prior sense, by being
recognizable”.9 The ‘existence’ of the lutis therefore cannot be analytically separated out from
their perception under the changing discursive conditions of Iranian modernity (tajadod), a
principle aim of which was the hierarchical codification of groups and identities in relation to
new conceptual and gendered categories of homeland (vatan), nation/citizen (millat), honor
(namus), and progress (tarraqi).10 I assert that, in the trajectory of Iranian modernity, new
discourses of nationalist hegemonic masculinity ascribed the lutis with a set of gendered,
pejorative signifiers and that, as a result, the luti was made ‘recognizable’ as a deviant, chaotic,
violent, homosexual, and distinctly non-normative measure of manliness in Iran.11 It is not my

9

Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative, (New York: Routledge, 1997), 5.
Reinhart Koselleck conceives of modernity (Neuzeit) as a temporal rupture wherein “time becomes a
dynamic and historical force in its own right,” and is represented by a modern historiographical
consciousness that “itself refers only to time, characterizing it as new, without, however, providing any
indication of the historical content of this time, or even its nature as a period.” I find this definition
compelling for considering the time (and space) of Iranian modernity, though the extent to which it can be
read as a universalizing and homogenous process ‘in the last instance’ remains a subject of debate. For an
excellent summation of, and postcolonial elaboration on Koselleck’s conceptual history see, Peter
Osborne, “Modernity is a Qualitative, Not a Chronological, Category” New Left Review, 192 (1992);
David Scott, Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2004), 23-57.
11
The notion of ‘hegemonic masculinities’ emerged out of a historical-sociological debate in the 1980s,
influenced by Gramsci, on the dynamic of patriarchy and the hierarchical differentialization of men’s
positions vis-à-vis the structure of sexual domination. Some of the theoretical insights of the debate particularily in considerations governing men’s construction of, and relation to others as men - are now
dated. However, as a placeholder for the process of prioritization certain normative masculine identities, I
find the term evocative and conceptually useful. For some prevalent examinations of the concept see;
R.W. Connell, Masculinities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Michael Kimmel, The
Gender of Desire: Essays on Male Sexuality (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005);
Stephen M. Whitehead & Frank J. Barrett, eds., The Masculinities Reader (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2005).
10
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interest to firmly establish if these pejorative discourses corresponded to the ‘reality’ of an
everyday luti (although in some respects, as we will see, the accusations did indeed align with
actual acts conducted by the group). Additionally, when speaking of the lutis as a sociological
formation, I do not imply that they constituted some reified corporate solidarity or other
necessarily class-attenuated position in the social hierarchy. Rather, this survey seeks to situate
the group in terms of what E.P. Thompson famously called their “plebian culture,” the traditions,
institutions and value systems that, while undermined by modernity and changing mechanisms of
production, were never wholly determined by such transformations.12
I base my genealogy primarily in an analytic consideration of how masculinized
discursive frameworks are productive of power relationships in a given society, while
simultaneously how masculinities are themselves produced (or foreclosed) in the course of their
historical and discursive deployment.13 Furthermore, I hold that construction of a subject does
not represent a singular outcome of one discourse or set of discourses, but rather emerges as a
“multiple and contradictory subject” that is as “contingent and precarious” as the sources of
power involved in its production.14 The anxieties of Iranian masculinity were played out in
historiography, state policy, the press, literary production, and film, and it is in these registers
that my analysis will engage with the emplotment of the luti in the discourse of hegemonic
12

E.P. Thompson, Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture (New York: New Press,
1991), 64.
13
This Janus-faced conceptualization of subjectivity is indebted to Foucault’s recognition that the social
subject is produced discursively by the creative interaction of relations of power in a given society. In
service of brevity I have abstained from providing a full characterization of Foucault’s work on power
and subjectivity, which undoubtedly transformed over the course of his career and was not limited to
questions of gender and sexual identity. For a comprehensive account of Foucault’s intellectual and
philosophical project see Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism
and Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
14
Chantal Mouffe, “Feminism, Citizenship and Radical Democratic Politics” in Judith Butler and Joan
W. Scott, eds., Feminists Theorize the Political (New York: Routledge, 1992), 372.

5

Iranian masculinity. Masculinity, like any gendered and sexed identity, is necessarily subject to,
and conditional upon a complex, and often contradictory, assemblage of ideologies and narrative
strategies. In the case of Iranian modernity, the dominant conceptualization of what being a
proper masculine subject entails has historically been tightly bound to nationalism, whose
performative and pedagogical uses were laden with novel foreign and indigenous understandings
of sex and gender. As such, in addition to a historico-sociological genealogy of the lutis, this
study interrogates the representational strategies employed in signifying them as figures of
discourse, beyond their embodied, socio-political personages. My imbrication of historicalsociological, historiographical, and representational assemblages allows me to holistically depict
as best as is possible the phenomenologically lived-experience of the lutis, as well the identity’s
subjective signification and resignification over the spatio-temporal zone of Iranian modernity.15

15

Compelling arguments against assuming a reductive synonymy between power and its objects/subjects,
can be found in Michael de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1984); Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1997). As is by now clear to the reader, Butler’s theoretical understanding of gender and
subjectivity has greatly influenced how I view the complex and contradictory identity of the Iranian luti in
this essay, while de Certeau has aided me in conceptualizing the survival of marginal gendered identities
and ethics even amidst the apocryphal discursive and practical dominance of others.

6

The Pre-Modern Origins of the Lutis: Masculinity Between ‘Ayyar and Futuwwa

Before I present the historical genesis of the lutis, first, a note of philological
clarification. The Persian word ‘luti’, and its less-frequently used plural form of ‘alvat,’ are
adopted from the Arabic term of the same name and in its original form refers to a sexual act
between two men. Khaled El-Rouayheb traces the usages of the term luti in the Arab world prior
to the 19th century, where he dispels its identification with a monolithic idea of “homosexuality.”
Although in the jurisprudence of Islamic law the luti was simply one who carried out an act of
liwat (unspecified anal intercourse with another man), in general usage the term almost
exclusively meant “pederast,” thus distinguishing the luti practitioner as the active-insertive
partner from those who preferred the passive-receptive role (mukhannath or ma’bun or ‘ilq).16
This usage of the term in relation to acts of penetrative anal intercourse continued under the
Ottoman Empire where, “unlike other sexual acts between males, such as kissing, fondling, or
intercrural intercourse, [it] was a crime subject to legal sanctions.”17 While not a pathologized
category of identity, the practice of the act of liwat was by no means cause for celebration in the
Arab and Ottoman world, “the luti was instead widely represented as a morally dissolute person,
a libertine…[and] often spoken of in the same breath as being a drinker of wine.”18 It remains
unclear exactly when the Arabic and the Persian morpheme dislocated from one another, yet by
the 14th century CE the commonly utilized adjectival term for homosexual acts in Persian had
modified into its currently used formation (lavat), with the (derogatory) term kuni representing a
16

Khaled El-Rouayheb, Before Homosexuality in the Arab-Islamic World, 1500-1800 (Chicago and
London: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 16-19.
17
Sara Scalenghe, Disability in the Ottoman Arab World, 1500-1800 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2014), 155-156.
18
El-Rouayheb, Before Homosexuality (2005), 19.
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practitioner of same-sex acts. Perhaps nowhere does Foucault’s dictum that, prior to the advent
of modernity, the very practice of sodomy stood as an “utterly confused category” hold more apt
than in untangling the meaning of the very term luti in its Persian context, given that, in Persian,
the semantic field and connotations of the term remained essentially ambiguous.19 Indeed, as
Philippe Rochard notes, one cannot even view the lutis as solely determined in reference to a
sexual formation at all, for indeed we have in other sources, like the 18th-century Indo-Persian
poet Mir Najat Isfahani, a use of the term to refer to a “companion of God.” Furthermore, in texts
like the Safavid administrative treatise Tadhkirat al-Muluk, a luti was described as the head of
the king’s acrobats, clowns, and entertainers.20 These multiform descriptions built into the
philology of luti reveal a clear diversity in early semantic deployments of the term. The disputed
origins of the word mirror the difficulty in defining the luti as sociological category in Iran, as in
many regards the identity is as mutually contradictory as the vocabulary used in its signification.
Yet, as we move into examining the lifeworlds and practices of the lutis, it remains clear that this
ambiguous semantic relationship to male-male sexual practices would remain a significant trace
in how they were perceived, and one that would come to haunt post-19th century incarnations of
the identity.
Although only isolated references to lutis appear in pre-19th century texts, it is possible to
draw out the lineage of the group through a review of a secondary literature on classical and
medieval organizations in Persian society.21 In sociological terms, the lutis as a social identity

19

Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (London:
Penguin, 1978), 101.
20
Philippe Rochard, “The Identities of the Iranian Zurkhanah” Iranian Studies, 35:1 (2002): 326
21
As a further point of clarification, some anthropological scholarship has claimed that luti refers to the
tribal peoples of Luristan, or to the Iranian gypsy population. However, in the course of my research I

8

trace their origins to three groups active in medieval Iranian society; artisanal guilds (futuwwa),
brigand organizations (‘ayyar), and Sufi brotherhoods (particularily those venerating Imam Ali
and Abu Muslim as saints). Although there is speculation that these groups have Iranian origins
prior to the Muslim conquest of Persia in 651 CE, there is little consensus on this point.22 Unlike
the Arabic al-futuwwa, whose associations were sometimes linked with criminality, Iranian
futuwwa groups occupied a relatively privileged role in the social hierarchy of classical and
medieval Persian society.23 Futuwwat milieus represented a variety of professional associations,
though were predominantly oriented around crafts, theatre and musical performance, literary
recitation, and wrestling. Despite the artisanal and petty-producer status of the Iranian futuwwa,
it is clear that the relation and affinity of these associations to spiritual practices, and a unique
ideal of masculinity, ordered the group as socially higher in standing than comparable economic
classes in Persia.24
The status of the Iranian futuwwa is best documented in an early 16th-century ‘manual of
chivalry,’ the Futuwwat-nameh-ye Sultani of Husayn Va’iz-i Kashefi.25 Kashefi’s seminal tome
documents the relationship of futuwwa associations to the javanmard ethic of masculinity, and to
related ideas of proper Sufi comportment (adab). As Kashifi writes, being futuwwa entailed more
could not locate any connection between the historical urban class of the lutis to either of these groups. As
such, I will speak to neither in this analysis.
22
For this thesis, see Julian Baldick, “The Iranian Origin of Futuwwa” Annali (Instituto Universitario
Orientale), 50 (1990): 345-61; Mohsen Zakeri, Sasanid Soldiers in Early Muslim Society: The Origins of
‘Ayyaran and Futuwwa (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1995).
23
For a historical evaluation of the Egyptian and Iraqi al-futuwwa, see Robert Irwin, “Futuwwa: Chivalry
and Gangsterism in Medieval Cairo” Muqarnas, 21 (2004): 161-170; Juan Cole and Moojan Momen,
“Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq: The Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843” Past and Present, 112:1
(1986): 112-143. For comparison with pre-modern Ottoman futuwwa organizations, known as akhis, see
G.G. Arnakis, “Futuwwa Traditions in the Ottoman Empire: Akhis, Bektashi Dervishes, and Craftsmen”
Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 12:4 (Oct., 1953): 232-247.
24
Mehdi Keyvani, Artisans and Guild Life in the Later Safavid Period: Contributions to the SocialEconomic History of Persia (Berlin: Klaus Schwartz, 1982).
25
Kashefi, Husayn Va’iz, Fotowwat-nama-ye soltani, ed. Mohammad Ja’far Mahjub (Tehran: 1971).
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than membership in one of the artisan guilds, but rather involved a spiritual commitment to
disregarding the self (nafs), enabled through the ethical self-cultivation of generosity of spirit,
self-sacrifice, chastity, hospitality, and courage, virtues which fell under the notion of
javanmardi. The ideal futuwwa member would display his commitment to the ethic of javanmard
through diligence in his labor, the doing of good works in the community, the cultivation of
martial strength and bodily improvement, and through a series of rituals and specific codes of
dress, including wearing set of trousers (shalwar) representing the chastity of the wearer, and a
special belt or sash (shadd) indicating the wearer’s readiness for battle.26 These publicly directed
and outward performances of javanmard distinguished the spirit of javanmard from more ascetic
and philosophical interpretations of Sufi practice (tasawwuf), most notably those invoked by
Suhrawardi.27 Additionally, as Dick Davis notes, these understandings of futuwwa manly
behaviour and ethical comportment had a distinctly Persian character, idealized in the characters
of the Iranian national epic, the Shahnameh. In particular, a sense of being javanmard is
embodied by the heroic warrior Rostam, who is presented in Ferdowsi’s text as “youthful,
impetuous, trusting to the point of gullibility, eager for friendship and adventure.”28 What is
interesting about Kashifi’s manual in particular, however, is it’s creative hybridization of Sufi
theological discourse with Persian literary staples in a didactic commentary directed towards layindividuals of the futuwwa guilds. This more populist reading distinguishes the text from some
26

For a more detailed reflection on the medieval codes of conduct of the futuwwa, see Arley Loewen,
“Proper Conduct (Adab) is Everything: The Futuwwat-namah-i Sultani of Husayn Va’iz-i Kashifi”
Iranian Studies, 36:4 (2003): 543-570; Mohammad Ja’far Mahjub, Ayin-e Javanmardi (Fotowwat) – The
Code of (Futuwwat) Chivalry (New York: Bibliotecha Persica Press, 2000).
27
For Suhrawardi’s esoteric reflection on futuwwa, see the translation of his futuwwat-name in Lloyd
Ridgeon, Jawanmardi: A Sufi Code of Honor (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 42-99.
28

Dick Davis, Epic and Sedition: The Case of Ferdowsi’s Shahname (Fayetteville: University of
Arkansas Press, 1992), 110.
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earlier commentaries on being javanmard that fell into the rarefied ‘mirror for princes’ literature,
directed primarily at notables and the ruling classes of Persian society.29
In some respects, the relation of being javanmard to early futuwwa guilds resembles the
chivalric societies of medieval Europe. This comparative study of the ethic occupied a niche for
some Orientalists, however more recent explorations of the origins and development of
javanmardi have critiqued the flattening and ahistorical tendencies of this mode of scholarship on
the futuwwa and javanmard.30 The most prominent distinction between the two is demonstrated
in Kashifi’s text as, unlike their European knightly counterparts, the Persian futuwwa were
accessible to ordinary people, and the practice of javanmardi incorporated the workmanlike
ideologies of trade and craftspeople, thus rooting the groups in the popular urban classes.31
29

A prominent example of this princely literature is the Qabusnameh of the 11th-century Ziyarid king,
Kay Kavus. Unsur al-Ma’ali Kaykavus ibn Iskander ibn Qabus - A Mirror for Princes: The Qabus-Nama,
trans. Reuben Levy (London: Cresset Press, 1951).
30
The tendency of these Orientalist accounts was primarily to analogize javanmard codes of conduct to
medieval European rites of chivalry, wherein the in Sufi-warrior stood in for the noble knight-errant. For
a prominent example of this type of categorization see Henri Corbin, A’ineh Javanmardi, trans. Ehsan
Naraghi (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1363/1984). Of course, the Orientalist search for chivalric antecedents and
affinities itself tells a story of 19th century social anxiety, particularily in the Victorian pressure to
pedagogically homogenize a sense of masculine civic virtue, heroism, and personal achievement. For
more literature on this topic see Norman Vance, The Sinews of Spirit: The Ideal of Christian Manliness in
Victorian Literature and Religious Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); J.A.
Mangan and James Walvin, eds., Manliness and Morality: Middle-Class Masculinity in Britain and
America, 1800-1940 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987); Robert A. Nye, Masculinity and
Male Codes of Honor in Modern France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). This is not to say it is
impossible to do a cross-cultural history of masculinities over the longue durée, see an interesting
methodological reflection on the issue from Simon Yarrow, “Masculinity as a World Historical Category
of Analysis” in What is Masculinity? Historical Dynamics from Antiquity to the Contemporary World,
eds. John H. Arnold and Sean Bready (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 114-139.
31
While Kashifi’s futuwwat-name is one of the more instructive texts showing the relationship of
javanmardi to the futuwwa, and the hierarchy of the futuwwa in relation to regular guilds, it is but one of
dozens of texts on the subject. For an edited volume containing many of these other futuwwat-name, see
Mihran Afshari, Futuwwat-nama ha va Rasa’il-i Khaksariya - The Futuwwat-nama of the Khaksar Order
(Tehran: Institute for the Humanities and Cultural Studies, 1381/2003). For English-language
commentaries on other elements of the futuwwa tradition, see Khachik Gevorgyan, “Futuwwa Varieties
and Futuwwat-nama Literature: An Attempt to Classify Futuwwa and Persian Futuwwat-namas” British
Journal of Middle East Studies, 40:1 (2013).
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The most paradigmatic of the public, performative javanmard rituals of the futuwwa was
the practice of traditional Iranian wrestling, or koshti pahlavani, which was conducted in
specially made ‘Houses of Strength’ (zurkhaneh). The somaticity of these wrestling practices
reflected the self-disciplining spirit of masculinity inhabited by the futuwwa and remained the
dominant cultural practice of the luti inheritors of the futuwwa tradition. As Joseph Alter notes in
his study of a similar wrestling practice in North India, “the symbolic components of the body
convey a set of standardized meanings on which any wrestler can build and from which he can
elaborate and interpret various situations.”32 In the context of proper masculine comportment
then, the somaticity of the Iranian male wrestlers body - self-regulated in a holistic fashion
through specific prescriptions of diet, health, morality, and ethics - was seen by the futuwwa as
the site of meaning par excellence through which the society of medieval Persia could be
engaged, and their identity as exceptional masculine subjects best demonstrated to the
community.33
In contrast to the futuwwa associations, the Iranian ‘ayyar held a more marginal, and
renegade status in pre-Qajar Iran. While sharing many of the same customs and rites as the
futuwwa, these organizations defined themselves explicitly as warriors rather than craftsman, and
operated as brigands and bandits. Prior to the 15th century, references to the ‘ayyar are most
common in popular literary romances, such as the Samak-i ‘ayyar and Darabnamah.34
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Historically however, it is plausible to assume the groups originated in the chaotic landscape
generated by the Mongol conquest of Persia, or from the later, fractured Sarbadar kingdoms that
arose from the collapse of the Mongol Ilkhanid dynasty in 1335 CE.35 Like the futuwwa, ‘ayyar
groups celebrated the embodiment of the ethic of javanmard as an integral component of their
comportment and understanding of self, which in turn elevated the group in the popular
imagination above common ruffians and low-lives in the urban milieu of Iranian cities.36 The
identity of ‘ayyar, which in the Arabic root literally translates to “scoundrel,” also entailed a
behavioral character of ‘shrewdness’, a contradictory character trait to the principles of chastity,
virtue, and honor within the ethical field of being javanmard. In contrast to the more domestic
virtues of the futuwwa, the ‘ayyars prized the fighting techniques of horsemanship (fonun-e
savari), dagger juggling (khanjar gozari), swiftness (chasti va chalaki), strength (govvat-e bazu)
and polo (chogan bazi), yet, like the futuwwa, they highly valued wrestling as a way to cultivate
these martial attributes.37 Not only were both the futuwwa and ‘ayyar groups united by a shared
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affiliation with wrestling and the institution of the zurkhaneh, but also both highly valued an
overriding sense of communal living that, in their different modes, served to help members to
live up to the high standards of being javanmard. The exceptionally close fraternal bonds of both
groups also went hand in hand with a general reticence towards heterosexual partnering.
Inherited directly from the Sufi tradition, chastity of all forms was central to the ethical
understanding of javanmardi and considered a crucial to self-control and mastery of the self. As
such, even in light of the more general tolerance – even praise for – male-male partnering in preQajar era Iran, one can only speculate whether the extraordinarily close and companionate bonds
of the futuwwa and ‘ayyar indeed featured same-sex practices, or whether such practices were
attributed to the groups after the fact or because of the name of their luti descendants.38 Given
this ambiguity, it is therefore wise to heed the warning of scholars like the classicist James
Davidson against “sodomania” – placing an undue emphasis on the sheer physical act and strict
power dynamics between men over their emotional, ethical, and reciprocal bonds– in
understanding this particular masculine lineage.39 A fruitful, comparative account of the
relationship between the futuwwa, ‘ayyar, and socio-cultural landscape of pre-Safavid Persia can
be found in Rosalind O’Hanlon’s historical study of masculinity in Mughal Indian political
culture. O’Hanlon suggests that “codes of martial bravery and correct manly behaviour” were
used to ameliorate the tense political relationships between client and patron, and between
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various local authorities in the volatile context of a declining Mughal imperial formation40. That
more ritualized forms of masculine comportment would take hold during times of political
uncertainty, as a means of solidifying bonds of social solidarity, is an apt description of the role
of the futuwwa and ‘ayyar in the turbulent milieu of pre-Safavid Persia, and the subsequent
supplanting of their masculine ethic by imperial hegemony.
The rise of the Safavid dynasty (1501-1736 CE) in Iran heralded an unprecedented
consolidation of imperial and state power, and the institutionalization of Twelver Shi’ism as the
state religion of Persia. A direct result of this administrative transformation was a
marginalization of the futuwwa guilds, as their heterodox, Sufi interpretations of Islam were
perceived as threat to the new political authorities. As Kathryn Babayan describes, “by the
seventeenth century…many of the guilds associated with the futuvvat had lost their status in the
realm of Safavi official culture. Storytellers, wrestlers, and acrobats, along with the Shahname
reciters, were placed among the beggars, gravediggers, and itinerant dervishes (qalandar)” in the
social hierarchy.41 Additionally, the renegade lifestyle of the ‘ayyar came under attack, as they
were perceived by court historians as “threats to public order established power” and as
embodying a “non- or even anti-courtly view of society.”42 With the futuwwa increasingly
pushed to the margins of society it is clear that, deprived of the stability of a regulated guild
structure, many turned to banditry, leading to a near synonymy of the terms ‘ayyar and futuwwa
in public and administrative discourse by the 18th century. Additionally, as the Shi’itization of
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Iran continued over the 16th and 17th centuries, many of the strict codes of ritual conduct adhered
to by the futuwwa groups were syncretized with popular Shi’i practices, such as the theatrical
mourning rituals for Imam Husayn (ta’ziyeh).43 This process of sociological comingling was
culminated under the Qajar dynasty (1785-1925), imbricating the futuwwa, ‘ayyar - and their
ethic and practices of being javanmard - under the sign of luti, a ‘new’ social type of the 19th
century. I have provided a historical account of the genesis of the luti as a social class in Iran to
make it clear that the group was not simply a scattered collection of thugs and criminals (awbash
or rendan), but rather the contradictory outcome of a long process of identity confusion and
sublimation, making the urban class at once both pietistic and combative, hypermasculine and
marginal. What had begun as two distinct social identities sharing an ethic of being javanmard
and a discursive tradition of public and performative Sufism was, by the 19th century,
sociologically intertwined into the category of the luti, an already ambiguous and charged term
of masculine presence.
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The Lutis as ‘New’ Social Type of the 19th Century: Medieval Manhood in Tension with
a Matriotic State
The 19th century gendering of Iranian nationalism was similar to, though not synonymous
with similar processes in the colonial and semi-colonial periphery.44 Founded in 1785 CE, the
Qajar dynasty inherited established conceptualizations of gender that had evolved organically in
Iranian society, and which became subject to modification under the discourse and practical
experience of encountering the Occidental Other. In terms of masculinity, a predominant Iranian
gendered societal form was the concept of familial honor (namus), which entailed and required
male vigilance to defend female purity. The loss of namus – seen as the outcome of seduction,
promiscuity, or rape - was conceived of as the root of social disorder (fitna), and thus was closely
regulated by a variety of disciplinary and discursive apparatuses embedded in the religious,
cultural, and social milieu of pre- and early-modern Iran. The encroachment of British and
Russian economic and territorial ambitions into Persia, including the Iranian loss of two wars
against the latter, exposed the vulnerability of the Qajars in protecting their ‘guarded domains’.
This material fact of loss went hand in hand with an increasing presence of foreign ideas,
technologies, and (to a lesser extent) persons in Iran, and narratives of inferiority vis-à-vis
Western powers brought back by travelling Iranian intellectuals.45 By the 1860s, and in response
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to these pressures, an imperative discourse of social, legal, and political reform had sprung up,
whose language articulated the land of Persia (vatan) in the language of a feminized, maternal
body under threat of disease and penetration. This new ‘matriotic’ discourse of the Iranian nation
(mellat) was invoked by prominent intellectuals like Mirza Akhundzadeh who, writing in an
1877 issue of the newspaper Akhtar (The Star), stated that “sons of the homeland” and “zealous
men” were the true representatives of Iran, and of Islam.46 Pronouncements of this sort marked a
discursive displacement of the paternal figure of the Shah in favor of stalwart and modern sons
defending the honor (namus) of the maternal Iranian nation, entailing a self-fashioned
intensification of the masculinist terrain of politics, state, and nation through familiar masculinist
cultural idioms, and new discourses of health, hygiene, reason, and a unified, fraternal Iranian
race.47
At first glance it may appear that the social class of the lutis could find some sort of
accommodation with the new regime of truth being created; after all, these were groups of men
whose spirit of brotherly commitment was unmatched, and martial prowess well-known
throughout Iran. However, the production of this new, fraternal field of politics also entailed
deep sexual anxieties and moral quandaries for its subjects, which in turn would mark the lutis as
outside the normative project of modern Iranian masculine identity. Afsaneh Najmabadi’s
seminal study of sex and gender in the Qajar period examines visual culture to show that the
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language of Iranian nationalist modernity and the creation of a ‘rational’ public sphere (with its
‘natural’ inhabitant, the citizen) was predicated in part on the repudiation of male love by
Western-oriented intellectuals. Again, the like broader aspects of gendering modernity, processes
of heterosocialization under colonial pressure, or in the framing of a national body politic, were
not unique to Iran, with similar processes observable in contexts including, but not limited to the
Arab world, to China, to Japan, to the tribal communities of early colonial Latin American.48 In
Najmabadi’s account, the creation of a field of Iranian heterosociability was founded on the
exclusion of its supposed Other, the paradigmatic, beardless young boys (amrad) who functioned
as an object of male love and desire in pre-Qajar society. In order for the vision of a fraternal
Iranian nation, devoted in love to its metaphorical mother, to be realized, new categories of
gender identity would have to be invented, namely a binary of modern, heterosexual men and
desegregated, unveiled modern women. Iranian reformers came to understand the absence of
women in the public sphere as the root cause of homosexuality (manifested in the amrads) and
utilized a technique of ‘temporal boxing’ to categorize those still engaged in same-sex practices
as backwards and unenlightened.49 In addition to its gendered components, the internalization of
a temporality of modernity by Iranian modernizers was a preeminent cause of an explosion of
fin-de-siècle literature, which framed the social ills of Iranians in light of the nation’s supposed
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lack vis-à-vis Europe.50 The naturalization of a male/female binary, and construction of same-sex
relations as a ‘problem’ was clearly expressed by the 19th century Iranian intellectual Mirza Aqa
Khan Kirmani, who states that “[m]en are naturally inclined towards socializing with and
enjoying the companionship of women…If a people are forbidden from this great blessing…then
inevitably the problem of sexual acts with boys and young male slaves is created, because boys
without facial hair resemble women.”51
The heterosocialization of the Iranian public would cast a significant shadow on the lifeworld of the lutis, stemming from both a real and imagined sense that their associations were
tainted with a surplus of homosociality. While Najmabadi describes the amrads as a principal
site of gendered modernization discourses, the longue durée of Safavid marginalization had
spatially ordered the lutis in close physical proximity to amrads in the lower-class
neighborhoods of Iranian cities. While at its height the futuwwa was a mark of societal
distinction, and several of the brotherhoods enjoyed spatial preference in the layout of Iranian
cities, their conflation with the ‘ayyar and transformation into the social class of the lutis was
accompanied by a spatial segregation of the group into poorer quarters of Shiraz, Tabriz, Tehran,
and other urban centers.52 These marginal spaces also housed many of the male brothels
50
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(amradkhane) and bathhouses, which, in the developing global registers of 19th century public
health discourse, increasingly came to be understood as a deviant sexualization of the public
sphere. These spaces also served as home to the swelling ranks of the urban poor, giving the
close-knit professional and recreational associations of the lutis an additional, classed
signification of being unclean and anarchic.53 While a full consideration of the gendered
construction of Iranian urban space remains too broad a topic for this analysis, the spatial
orientation of the luti social class evidently aligns with the segregation of non-normative sexual
identities into particular quarters (mahalleh) of Iranian cities, with the coffeehouses
(qavehkhaneh) and other meeting places popular among the lutis also serving as host to
prostitutes, gamblers, musicians, and other social forms considered as less-than-reputable.54 The
outcome of this spatial alignment was the common comparison of the lutis with the poor, urban
social class of jahel (literally, “ignorant”). Hamid Dabashi unwittingly exemplifies this
conceptual conflation when he describes the jahels as “a type of lumpen who embodied the most
sordid traits of patriarchy. A caricature of the medieval practice of futuwwat (chivalry), the jahel
represented the basest manifestations of male chauvinism in which masculine “honor” was
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vested in the chastity of men’s female relatives. The jahels themselves, however, frequented the
bordellos and prided themselves in pederasty.”55 This conceptual comingling of ‘deviant’ sexual
practices - of low-class jahels indulging in the pleasures of amrads - into the identity of the lutis
gave the group an addition air of menace in the eyes of reformist and modernist masculinities in
the 19th century.
However, and setting the lutis apart from their erstwhile deviant neighbors, was the way
in which - on the basis of their martial prowess - the lutis would establish themselves as de facto
leaders of the local communities of the urban poor, and guardians of their ‘turf’ (patoq). The
violence of the lutis looms heavily in both 19th century accounts of the group, and more recent
publications, with a general consensus that some portion of their membership were involved in
underground criminal networks. This attitude stems from occasional luti attacks on the
propertied classes (especially in times of economic hardship), and also from the occasional street
battles that would break out between rival neighborhoods, and in which the lutis took an active
part (ostensibly to display the strength of their masculinity in the eyes of their peers).56 In
particular, one adjective stuck to describe the lutis in this context, with commentators referring to
the group pejoratively as knife-wielders (chaqu keshan).57 As Martin describes, Iranian elites
frequently singled out the supposed criminal deviance, drunkenness, and vice of the lutis as
55
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particularily deleterious to society, while downplaying the criminality of subjectivities allied
with the governing regime. To take one example of the hypocrisy of the stance, this singling-out
stood in contrast to the treatment of the newly established members of the soldiery, generally
drawn from the milieu of the urban poor, and whose arbitrary criminal activity and rowdiness
often surpassed the worst excesses of the lutis.58 This relational framing of ‘acceptable’
masculine excess highlights Mrinalini Sinha’s contention that the “rhetorical and ideological
efficacy” of masculinity lies in its ability to ground “various arrangements of power”, in this case
the legitimacy of the modern military establishment, and not only those arrangements concerning
the concept of gender itself.59
Inherited from the futuwwa tradition, the martial masculinity of the luti’s 19th-century
incarnation was honed in the communal socius of the zurkhaneh. Philippe Rochard has provided
the most extensive history of the Iranian zurkhaneh and his consideration of the space as one of
“institutionalized marginality” clearly resonates with the heteronormative gendering of Iranian
space and society in the 19th century.60 The centrality of strength to the ethical embodiment of
javanmard was reflected in the organization of the lutis around the zurkhaneh, and the associated
virtue of chastity was reflected in the underlying belief that sex with women would sap the
strength of the wrestler.61 The public and performative shows of strength undertaken by luti
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participants at the zurkhaneh were often interpreted in reformist discourses as representing a cult
of violence, whose membership consisted of unpredictable urban strongmen, though some would
continue to characterize the javanmardi ethic and aesthetic in more romanticized terms.62 An
anecdote from Muhammad Ali Jamalzadeh, the founder of the Iranian short story, of his
childhood observance of a zurkhaneh demonstrates the alterity embodied in the wrestler’s
physical form, a source of fascination and disgust for 19th century observers; “I saw physiques
there that day unlike any I had ever in my lifetime seen…the thick, heavily knotted arms, broad,
shieldlike chests, exercised bellies, swelling flanks, bulging oval muscles, narrow waists, taut
thighs, solid frames, and hollow cheeks without flesh which are the signs of a gymnast.”63 These,
and other accounts of the masculine bodies of the lutis would mark their presence in discourse as
innately physical, and deficient in the proper, modern regulation of the self through moderate,
‘healthy’ physical exercise.
The lutis were also intertwined with the construction of modern Iranian political culture.
Floor examines the case of 19th-century Shiraz to illustrate how local leaders and notables
viewed the lutis as toughs available for purchase, occasionally cooperating with them for
political purposes.64 The details of this quixotic cooperation shows that, while considered useful
by local power brokers, the lutis held no firm political loyalty to one faction or another due to
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their devotion to their own code of javanmardi ethics, and thus were generally mistrusted by all
parties. A pejorative entrenchment of the idea of lutis as essentially thugs for hire informed much
of the analysis around their role in the 1953 coup. Many outside observers of the lutis in action
could offer only tentative and vague descriptions at best. Thus for Richard Cottam, an American
CIA operative stationed in Tehran during the 1953 coup d’état, the lutis were but the strongest
men in an apolitical mob “who can be hired for any kind of corrupt or terroristic activity” and
who “control a number of brothels or gambling houses.”65 However, in light of somewhat shared
perceptions of discrimination at the hands of the modernizing and reforming state and
intellectual classes, the lutis occasionally found themselves in coalition with members of the
Shi’ite religious establishment (‘ulema). As Momen describes, members of the ulema in Iranian
towns would often court the lutis for personal gain or to collect religious taxes (zakat), while “the
lutis in turn had a protector with whom they could take refuge if the government moved against
them.”66 A report from the British Foreign Office in Iran even noted that some religious students
(tollab) enjoyed a close enough relationship with the lutis that that they became known as the
alwat-e mu’ammam, or turbaned lutis.67 This collaboration, however, did not entail that the lutis
held an any particular spiritual reverence for the ‘ulema, as evidenced by another testimonial of
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Jamalzadeh, who notes that some lutis had not hesitated to defrock and beat members of the
‘ulema with whom they disagreed during the nation’s Constitutional Revolution (1906-1911).68
The Constitutional Revolution represented a moment of heightened visibility for the lutis,
though rarely positively, as dominant Iranian historical discourse described the events of the
Revolution as the moment of “awakening” and “enlightenment” for the nation and, as such,
vehemently castigated perceived hindrances to the arrival of modernity.69 Often reflecting on
their own experiences during the movement, historians including Ahmad Kasravi, Mehdi
Malekzadeh, and Nazem Kermani narrated this ‘awakening’ and its participants, while an
explosion of publications, like the influential Habl al-Matin (The Firm Cord), described the
events of the uprisings in close to real time.70 Johanna de Groot suggests that as the political
partisanship and conflict of the revolution spread, “so the discourses of manhood, sexual honor,
and sexuality itself intensified with real possibilities of political and territorial disintegration.”71
Subsequently, in discursive terms the evolving moral register that had divided the lutis into
‘good,’ chivalric, and virtuous types, as well as ‘bad,’ criminal, and sexually deviant ones was
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now being deployed to map the identity of the group onto the political registers of pro- and anticonstitutionalism.72
A paradigmatic example of the luti’s politicization is Sattar Khan, a self-identified luti
who achieved the status of a national hero in Iranian historical discourse for leading the proconstitutionalists in Tabriz. Kasravi describes encountering Sattar Khan, noting in particular the
luti attributes of “his masculine face (chehreh-i-ye mardaneh), dexterous composure (cheboki-ye
raftar), and his self-discipline (khistandari).”73 However, even as prominent a luti as Sattar Khan
could not escape his enfoldment into the prevailing gendered discursive of proper, modern
Iranian masculinity, topographically situated on the map of Iranian political culture. Khan’s
background as a renegade, outlaw, and horse-thief, and his charismatic sway over the lowerclasses of Tabriz allowed him to establish his position as a commander and national leader,
however this luti background affirmed to those who would narrate the history of the revolution
that Khan did not have the mental understanding to grasp the political or moral stakes at hand, or
rational, bureaucratic consciousness capable of translating military success to statecraft. In
contrast to more ‘enlightened’ champions of the constitutional cause, Khan was described almost
exclusively with reference to his emotional and bodily presence, with his masculinity seen as too
charged, and too virulent for the sustained work of modern political life.74 While ‘heroic,’ Khan
was seen as lacking the knowledge necessary to grasp the goals of the constitutional movement,
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and, like his luti brothers, as embodying the wrong sort of masculine identity for the future of the
Iranian nation.
Over Iran’s 19th and early 20th centuries, it is thus fair to say that the central gendered
trends were, on the one hand, the discursive and significatory association of the state as a
maternal figure, who required modern, disciplined male subjects to defend her, and, on the other
hand, the exclusion of gender identities and performances that did not fit into this discourse.
Over the terrain of masculinity, these discourses served to create a privileged site of politics, to
be inhabited by so-called “men of order,” and from which the lutis were constructed as a binary
opposite, as “men of disorder.”75 However, and particularily from the 1940s onwards,
masculinity became increasingly defined between statist and Islamicate models (although both
articulated their respective masculinities in the discourse of heterosocialized modernity, and in
service of the Iranian nation). To reiterate, the concept of “hegemonic masculinity” describes
what John Tosh refers to as “those masculine attributes which are must widely subscribed to –
and least questioned –in a given social formation, the ‘common sense’ of gender as
acknowledged by all men save those whose masculinity is oppositional or deviant.”76 In 1925,
the nascent project of Iranian constitutional democracy was brought to an end by the Reza
Pahlavi’s rise to autocratic power, though the synonymizing of fraternal masculinity with the
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state, heterosocialization of Iranian society, and exclusion of alternate masculine configurations
continued apace with its historical development in the Qajar period.
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The Lutis as Impediment to National Progress: Style and Sport under Reza Shah Pahlavi

With even greater emphasis than the preceding period, the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi
(1925-1941) articulated modernity with an overriding emphasis on Westernization and
secularization, concepts mobilized in gender politics through such initiatives as making of civil
marriage, establishment of schools for girls, and the mandating of Western dress and unveiling
for women. The material role of the lutis in this period is small, no doubt because of the
repressive military pacification of urban social unrest by the state.77 However, while the social
type of the luti remained confined to their neighborhood under the Pahlavi regime, they did not
cease to be factored into discourses of proper masculinity. The Pahlavi project of strict
secularization dovetailed with its attempt to establish a hegemonic, ideal, heteronormative male
identity, which stressed men’s composure and rationality, a bourgeois sense of interior self, and a
patriotic devotion to both science and the nation-state. As readers will no doubt note, the history
of the lutis as both a social type and a gendered specter of modernist discourse shares some
commonalities with the Egyptian al-futuwwa - a distinct and subaltern urban class of masculine
identity - documented in Wilson Chacko Jacob’s recent study.78 In Working Out Egypt, Jacob
writes of how the bourgeois Egyptian effendi class performatively remade categories of
masculinity in order to reproduce its own social life as the national culture. Jacob describes this
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process as “contingent on the construction and maintenance of rhetorical, legal, and physical
boundaries between the modern and respectable, on the one hand, and the archaic and
disreputable, on the other.”79 This process, as has been noted, is similar to the production of
gendered citizens of the Iranian nation in the 19th and early 20th century. However, Jacob’s
conclusion that “the politics of al-futuwwa was irreconcilable with the modern public sphere that
emerged in Egypt in the 1920s and 1930s”80 - and thus faded into sometimes nostalgic, but
mostly ambivalent memory - is complicated in the Iranian case, as the lutis and their ethical
understanding of being javanmard continued to resonate in Iranian society, particularly in
literary and filmic representational forms.81 Additionally, the normative figures of new Iranian
masculinity were not unified into a singular figure of masculine discourse like the Egyptian
effendiyya, and represented a range of political affiliations. Indeed, despite the hegemonic status
of Pahlavi masculinities under the prevailing political order of the era, men who self-identified as
modernizers, Westernizers, intellectuals, and officers, as well as other male-coded identities
associated with state policy were themselves subject to critique from religious and clerical
sources.
Coined by the dissident (though secular) author Jalal Al-e Ahmad during the Second
World War, the adjectival moniker of gharbzadeghi, or West-struck/West-toxified, was used a
catch-all to criticize the vacuous self-identification with Western cultural values practiced by
advocates of secularizing and modernization policy. While accusations of gharbzadeghi were
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deployed across genders, related caricatures of Pahlavi masculinity in particular were deployed
by the regime’s opponents as early as the 1920s, and were signified through the concepts of
fokoli (bow-tie wearer) and farangima’ab, (in European style). The way in which these
pejorative discourses conceived of style and fashion spoke to the emphasis the Pahlavi state
placed on dress as a principal site of gendered masculine performance.82 Fashion had
significantly figured into the life-world of the lutis of the 19th century, with many presenting
their commitment to a javanmardi ethic through wearing of the shalwar and shadd, as had their
ancestors, but also complimented by a more recent set garb including; a felt cap (dash mashti),
duster coat (qaba), large patterned handkerchiefs made in the city of Yazd (dastehmal-e Yazdi),
and woven slippers (giveh). The clothes were accompanied by ceremonial machetes and knives
(chaqu), from which the aforementioned chaqu-keshan took their name.83 These ‘traditional’
costumes were targeted explicitly by the dress reform laws of 1928, along with the attire of the
‘ulema, leading many of the lutis to, grudgingly, accept more normative, Western attire in their
daily lives and practices. This acquiescence was not without resistance, as the new style regime
of the lutis artfully subverted the norms of comportment advocated by the regime through
refusing to wear the mandated ties and by donning their new, mandated fedoras over top of their
original dash mashti, giving the group a towering stature over others.84 The new ‘look’ of the
lutis was, although Western, also distinct in the eyes of most from the reviled fokoli, who were
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mostly members of the lower classes aspiring to the fashion of the elite in an attempt to gain
cultural capital, or, in other words, “empty wallets” in new suits.85
Another central program of articulating masculinity in the Pahlavi period was the
reformation of sport and sporting practices in Iran. As Cyrus Schayegh notes, classist legacies of
the 19th century were incorporated in the 20th century into the minds of a nascent Iranian middleclass the identity, for who the identity of the luti came to stand in for all of the “degenerative
characteristics” of the lower classes.86 The centrality of the zurkhaneh and wrestling, being so
closely associated with this milieu, was subject to special sanction a regime that, despite its selfpurported celebration of a pre-Islamic Persian racial past, derided the zurkhaneh tradition as
another aspect of backwardness afflicting the aspiration of national modernity. By contrast, the
Pahlavi nation was to be represented by a new class of male bodies, honed through approved
team sports, and through the various scouting associations propagated by the state. On the terrain
of physical sport, the lutis and their practice of zurkhaneh were considered, despite their strength,
to be poor role models for men, as their sporting culture was seen as too individualistic, too
unclean, and too undisciplined for ‘modern times’. Notably, much of this discourse, as in the 19th
century, was used to legitimate the normative masculinity of soldiers and the officer classes, for
whom ‘proper’, team-based sporting culture was de rigueur.87
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After Reza Shah’s abdication, the occupation of Iran by Allied forces from 1941 to 1946,
and the rise of his son, Mohammad Reza Shah (1941-1979) to the Peacock Throne, the
‘traditional’ lutis had, like their amrad cousins, mostly faded into the collective memory of a
more hegemonically consolidated Iranian nation. Marking their place was another social class
that, while keeping some of the traditions of javanmard and attending the zurkhaneh, operated as
a distinct social formation. The particularities of this more recent articulation of the luti
masculine ethos during the 1950s and 1960s merits attention but escapes the temporal focus of
this analysis. In general however, despite a resurgence during the tumultuous events of the 1953
Iranian coup, the fading presence of the lutis thus suggests both repression and a gradual
assimilation of the group into more hegemonically stable socio-political coalitions and gender
identities, with some actively affiliating with the infamous hezbollahis, or militant Islamist
activists of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and others leaving their tradition of javanmard to
nostalgic memory and joining the subsidized new Iranian working-classes, or the ranks of
nationalist Iranian émigrés from Norway to Los Angeles.
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Conclusion

In the course of this analysis I have attempted to introduce a new element into the
narratives of gendered Iranian modernity. To this end, I have reconstructed the counternormative history of luti masculinity, founded in the medieval, heterodox milieu of Sufi theology
and urban social solidarities, performed in the back streets and alleyways of Qajar and Pahlavi
Iranian cities, and emplotted into the national imaginary of Iranian society, through nationalist
and modernist discourses of sex and gender. Writing on the vastly different context of the
European Low Countries, the cultural historian Stefan Dudink notes a problematic aspect of
contemporary research on masculinity, namely “the idea that somewhere ‘around 1800’ a
modern regime of sexual difference emerged in which this difference was constructed as both
binary and natural…continues – implicitly – to shape much work in gender history.”88 This point
is no less true for the history of modern Iranian masculinity, as the lack of scholarly attention to
unruly, contradictory presence of the lutis, and their masculine ethic of javanmard, attests.
Although the lutis, and even the linguistic term luti itself, have all but vanished from the
landscape of contemporary Iran, the interstices carved out by the group’s counter-normative
presence remain.
In an anthropological study of contemporary Iran, Fariba Adelkhah notes how, under the
Islamic Republic, groups of men she identifies as javanmards, street toughs in the mould of the
lutis, have been subject to arrest and social targeting by the state. Adelkhah claims that the
narrative focus of recent governmental authority on these javanmards shows that “the Republic
88
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seeks above all to establish its hegemony in populous districts and supplant rival influences,”
both politically and in gendered terms.89 Undoubtedly the Islamic Republic employs its own
understand of hegemonic masculinity, rooted in a discursive tradition distinct from the
secularizing and Westernizing impulses of Qajar and Pahlavi era reformers, and even from the
non-revolutionary tradition of Shi’i intellectual culture. However, Adelkhah also notes how the
state has critically intervened into the ethical field of javanmard, and attempted to isolate out the
qualities it perceives as virtuous from its embodied manifestation in the life-world of the
javanmards themselves, inheritance from the long history of the lutis. This attempt to redeem the
ethic from its more sordid past has come through its rationalization, bureaucratization, and, to a
certain extent, democratization by the broader community, and the association of a javanmardi
masculinity with the neoliberal demands of competitive economics and profit-making. Although
the zurkhaneh as an institution continues to exist in contemporary Iran, they too are subject to the
new direction of the Iranian state, whose campaign of cultural marketing has highlighted the
wrestling as an ‘authentic’ national sport, and initiated public-private ventures to build new,
modern facilities for the training of athletes.90 By contrast, Shahin Gerami notes how this
(post)modern ethic of the free market coexists with a hypermasculine ideology premised on
religiosity and martyrdom for the state, which privileges certain men and masculinities over
others.91 Furthermore, as some recent ethnographic reflections suggest, masculine identities
amongst Iranian youth in particular appear to be developing towards a cosmopolitan, networked,
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and globalized subjectivity, though this pattern does appear to reflect upper- and middle-class
residents of Iran’s major cities more than it does the majority of the population.92 In only one
case study could I locate a modern-day identification with the lutis, evidenced in a recent
ethnography of a down-and-out neighborhood in Tehran and its relationship with a new, middleclass housing development in its midst. Interestingly, and in recursive fashion, the young men of
these respective class positions articulated their problems in the language of lutis, and of fokoli,
indicating a new way the understanding of proper masculinity may have been redeployed in the
wake of new problems brought by privatization and the weakening of the welfare state in
contemporary Iran.93
What these recent developments show is that, although the lutis may have receded as a
social type, and as a figure of discourse, masculinity in Iran remains a contradictory and
contested domain of social and political life. Needless to say, new Iranian masculinities, should
they arise, will be as much a subject to the discourses of Iranian hegemonic masculinity as an
oppositional presence within them, a facet of modernity as well as, to quote Dipesh Chakrabarty,
the carriers of subaltern pasts inaugurating “a disjuncture of the present with itself.”94
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